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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

NORMAN 0. WHITAKER,
Petitioner,
vs.

;)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

]
]

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, ;
and UTAH STATE RETIREMENT
;
OFFICE a.k.a UTAH STATE
;
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS,
;
Respondents.

] i Case No. 20061103

BRIEF OF APPELLANT NORMAN O. WHITAKER
APPEAL FROM THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, A STATE AGENCY
I
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
In Utah Code Annotated §49-11-613(7) (2005), §63-46b-16(l) (1998), and §782a-3(2)(a) (2001), the Legislature conferred appellate jurisdiction upon the Utah Court of
Appeals to review appeals resulting from the final orders of formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies. This case involves the timely appeal by Norman O.
Whitaker (herein "Norm") from a final order issued on November 9,2006, by the Utan
State Retirement Board (herein the "USRB"), which is a State agency (see, Utah Code
Ann. §49-1 l-201(2)(a) (2004)), that issued a final order styled, "Amended Recommended
Findings of Facts [sic] and Conclusions of Law" (herein the "USRB's Decision").

II
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the USRB err by narrowly interpreting Utah Code Ann. §49-11-

401(3)(c) & (e) (2005) in a manner inconsistent with the Legislature's intent that the Utah
State Retirement Insurance Benefit Act (herein the "USRIBA") shall be "liberally
construed to provide maximum benefits and protections ..." to Norm as mandated by
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-103(2) (2002)? This issue was preserved below at R. 52 - 54,
173-178.
Standard of Review: The standard of review on this issue is correction of error
with no deference to the USRB's Decision because it involves a legal issue interpretation of a statute in a manner that is consistent with Legislative intent and the
USRB has not provided any documentation that its statutory interpretation promotes
uniformity or actuarial soundness. See, Sindt v. Retirement Board, 2007 UT 16, f 5, 570
Utah Adv. Rep. 71; Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah Ct.App.
1991); Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board, 795 P.2d 671, 674-5 (Utah Ct.App.
1990).
2.

Did the USRB err by determining that Norm is not entitled to purchase his

15.708 years of earned service credit, even though the USRB also determined those years
of service to be "ineligible" for service credit - and, in essence, "forfeited" to the USRB?
This issue was preserved below at R. 56 - 57, 181 - 182.
Standard of Review: The standard of review on this issue is correction of error
with no deference to the USRB's decision because it involves a legal issue-

2

interpretation of a statute in a manner consistent with Legislative intent and the USRB has
not provided any documentation that its statutory interpretation promotes uniformity or
actuarial soundness. See, Sindt v. Retirement Board at f 5; Tolman v. Salt Lake County
Attorney at 27; Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board at 674-5.
3.

Did the USRB err by determining that the USRB's prior representations to

Norm do not warrant the application of equitable estoppel in this case? This issue was
preserved below at R. 54 - 56, 178-181.
Standard of Review: The standard of review on this issue is abuse of discretion
with intermediate deference to the USRB's Decision because it involves the application
of facts to the legal standard of equitable estoppel which is a mixed question of fact and
law. See, Trolley Square Associates v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct.App. 1994);
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney at 27; Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board at
674-5. Further, to the extent that Norm challenges the USRB's factual findings incident
to addressing this issue, those findings will be reviewed for clear error after giving
deference to the USRB's findings. See, Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney at 27.
4.

Did the USRB violate Norm's constitutional due process rights to effective

judicial review by failing to make a complete record of the evidentiary hearing held
below before the USRB's Hearing Officer? This issue was preserved below at R. 252,
280,353-355. 1

1. The record is clear that Respondents were on notice of their potential problem with
the accuracy of the transcript because Norm's counsel apprised the Hearing Officer of the
same on three (3) separate occasions. R. 252, 280, 350-355. Unfortunately, neither the
Hearing Officer or the USRB took any remedial steps to rectify this issue.
3

Standard of Review: The standard of review on this issue is correction of error
with no deference to the USRB's decision because the due process claim involves a
question of Constitutional law. See, Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney at 28.
Ill
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUES, AND RULES
Pursuant to Rules 24(a)(6) and 24(a)( 11) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Norm has concurrently submitted an Addendum that contains the following
applicable constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules/procedures, to-wit:
1.

The pertinent Constitutional provisions are as follows:
A.

United States Constitution, Amendment 14, Section 1

B.

Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7

The foregoing Constitutional provisions are attached as Exhibit A to the Addendum.
2.

Determinative Statutory Provisions:
A.

The "General Provisions" contained in the Utah State Retirement

and Insurance Benefit Act (hereafter "USRIB A"), including the following
highlighted/pertinent provisions;
• (i)

Utah Code Ann. §49-11 -101 et. seq. (2002)

(ii)
Utah Code Ann.
(iii)
Utah Code Ann.
(iv)
Utah Code Ann.
(v)
Utah Code Ann.
(vi)
Utah Code Ann.
(vii) Utah Code Ann.
(viii) Utah Code Ann.

§49-11-102(38) (2005)
§49-11-103(2) (2002)
§49-1 l-203(l)(d) & (k) (2002)
§49-11-401(3) (2005)
§49-11 -403 (2006)
§49-11 -607 (2003)
§49-11-613(7) (2005)

The foregoing statutes are attached as Exhibit B to the Addendum.

4

B.

The applicable statutory provisions from the Public Employees'

Noncontributory System Act, including the following highlighted/pertinent provisions:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.

§4943-102 (2006)
§49-13-201 (2005)
§49-13-302 (2002)
§49-13-402(2) (2005)

The foregoing statutory provisions are attached as Exhibit C to the Addendum.
3.

The pertinent rules/procedures are as follows:
A.

Utah State Retirement Board Adjudicative Hearing Procedure 5(g)

The foregoing Rule is attached as Exhibit D to the Addendum.
IV
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Case Nature, Course, Proceedings and Disposition
1.

Nature of the Case: For the past fifteen (15) years, Norm has concurrently

worked two full time positions2 with participating employers in the Utah State Retirement
Systems (herein "the URS"). R. 109 -111, Norm's Exhibit 1 (R. 112 - 128), R. 383 p.
131-135. Norm is sixty-two (62) years old and desires to retire with the full thirty-two

2. Under the Public Employees' Noncontributory System codified at Utah Code Ann.
§49-13-102, in the USRIBA, the Legislature has defined full time employment to:
"requires an average of 20 hours or more per week, except as modified by the board, and
who receives benefits normally provided by the participating employer." Utah Code Ann.
§49-13-102(4)(a) (2006). The USRB does not dispute that both of Norm's positions are
encompassed within the foregoing statutory definition of full time employment nor that
Norm had5 in fact, actually earned the years of service credit he sought in his appeal
below to the USRB.

5

(32)3 years of retirement service credit he has earned from his two (2) full time positions.
R. 004-006; Respondent's Exhibit 4 (R. 158). The URS has determined, however, that
only 17.087 of Norm's years of earned service credit are eligible for use in calculating his
retirement benefit (thereby extinguishing/forfeiting 15.7084 of his years of earned service
credit), even though the URS had previously made repeated representations to Norm that
both of his full time positions were accruing full years of service credit under the
USRIBA. R. 383 p. 134-144.
2.

Course of the Proceedings Below: On December 14, 2005, Robert V.

Newman, Executive Director of the Utah State Retirement Office and in behalf of the
URS, denied Norm's request to retire with 32.795 years of retirement service credit. R.
003. Norm timely appealed to the USRB, which appointed Hearing Officer Richard C.
Howe to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make Recommended Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order. R. 004, 049. After conducting an evidentiary hearing on
July 14, 2006, Hearing Officer Howe issued his ruling on August 15, 2006 and upheld

3. As of May 16, 2006, Norm had worked for the following employers and earned a total
of 32.795 years of service credit:
State of Utah
17.087 years of service credit
West Point City
12.208 years of service credit
Davis & Weber County
3.5 years of service credit
Total 32.795 years of service credit
See, Norm's Exhibit 4 (R. 141 - 144); Respondent's Exhibit 2 (R. 155); Respondent's
Exhibit 4 (R. 158); R. 109 -110; R, 383 p. 82.
4. The 15.708 figure represents Norm's total years of service credit that the URS has
"forfeited" as of May 16, 2006. All references herein will refer to those forfeited years of
earned service credit as of May 16, 2006, unless otherwise noted.
6

Mr. Newman's denial of Norm's request. R. 239, 241. The Hearing Officer signed
Amended Recommended Findings of Facts [sic] and Conclusions of Law and Order on
October 26, 2006,5 which were thereafter approved and signed by the USRB's Board
President, John Lunt, on November 9, 2006. R. 370 - 378.
3.

Disposition Below: The USRB upheld the URS' denial of Norm's request

to retire with the 32.795 years of earned and paid service credit.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.

USRB's Decision and Findings of Fact:

The findings of fact entered by Hearing Officer Howe and approved in the
USRB's Decision are as follows:
"1.

Petitioner is a member of the Public Employees Non-Contributory

Retirement System ("PERS") due to his employment with the State of Utah ("State") and
West Point City ("City"). Petitioner is also a member of the Public Employees

5. The USRB's Decision is labeled as "Amended" because Respondent's counsel
prepared an initial draft of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order that was
objected to by Norm's counsel. R. 249 - 273; R. 274 - 323. Prior to preparing this
Appellant's Brief, Norm and his counsel believed that the Amended Recommended
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order of October 26th were the only
Findings, Conclusions or Order bearing the Hearing Officer's signature. Unbeknownst to
Norm and his counsel and after reviewing the record, Norm and his counsel have now
learned that Respondent's initial draft of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Order were apparently submitted to Hearing Officer Howe on September 1, 2006
(just one business day after a copy was e-mailed to Norm's counsel) and were signed by
Hearing Officer Howe on September 1, 2006. R. 247, 249 - 273. The September 1, 2006,
Findings, however, do not bear a signed certificate of mailing and the record does not
reflect how these Findings were submitted to Hearing Officer Howe. The September 1,
2006, Findings were not ultimately signed by the USRB and do therefore not constitute
the final order of the USRB.
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Contributory Retirement System ["PECRS"] due to his previous employment with Davis
and Weber County Canal Agency ("County").
2.

PERS and PECRS are administered by the Utah State Retirement Office

(herein "the Retirement Office").
3.

Petitioner began working for the State on April 15, 1989, and is currently an

active employee.
4.

Petitioner began working for the City on January 1, 1994, and is currently

an active employee.
5.

Petitioner was employed with the County from November 1, 1989, through

April 30, 1993. Petitioner worked for a total of 3.5 years for the County.
6.

On September 14, 2005, the Retirement Office, at Petitioner's request, sent

Petitioner an Estimate showing the calculation of his service credit. Petitioner's Estimate
included a three year military service purchase.
7.

The Retirement Office sends out annual statements to all members who

have contributions on record. The annual statements include total years worked for all
participating employers. For example the statement sent out after the end of 2004 read in
part as follows:
"SERVICE CREDIT PER SYSTEM AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2004
CONTRIBUTORY LOCAL GOVERNMENT [ 1 ]
NONCONTRIBUTORY LOCAL GOVERNMENT [2]
NONCONTRIBUTORY STATE AND SCHOOL [2]

3.500 YEARS
10.834 YEARS
15.654 YEARS"

"PLEASE EXAMINE THIS STATEMENT - If the balances shown on
the accompanying statement are not correct, please write promptly giving
details of any differences to our auditors, Deloitte & Touche, Attention:

8

URS, 50 South Main Street, Suite 1800, Salt Lake City, UT 84144-0458,
who are presently engaged in the regular examination of our financial
statements. Correspondence should include your name, Social Security
number, and a copy of this statement. If this statement is correct, no
reply is necessary." (Emphasis in original).
8.

The following or a similar notification is contained on every annual

statement sent out by the Retirement Office, "If you are a member in more than one
Retirement System, if you are a part-time elected or appointed official, or if you are
employed with two or more employers at the same time, you will need to contact the
Retirement Office."
9.

Petitioner testified that in or about October 2003, he contacted the

Retirement Office to request a retirement estimate. In November 2003, he received the
retirement estimate notifying him that as of May 16, 2006, assuming continued full-time
employment, he would have a total of 17.087 years of service credit.
10.

Marcia Stroud, Retirement Advisor for the Retirement Office, testified that

on August 29,2005, at Petitioner's request, she sent Petitioner a new retirement benefit
estimate showing the calculation of Petitioner's retirement service credit. Different from
the 2003 estimate, this estimate included a three-year service credit purchase for military
service. The estimate showed that on May 16, 2006, assuming continued full-time
employment, Petitioner would have 20.087 years of service credit.
11.

Petitioner testified that on November 2, 2005, in a meeting with himself,

Mr. Felshaw King, and Retirement Office employees Marcia Stroud and Chris Blevins.
the Retirement Office clearly explained to Petitioner that he was not eligible for more
than one year of service credit for one fiscal or calendar year of work.
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12.

Petitioner testified that he has not retired or terminated his employment

with either the State or the City.
13.

Petitioner testified that had he known in 1994 that he could not count

toward his retirement two years of service credit for each year that he worked for two
employers, he would have accepted another position with West Point City, would have
resigned has [sic] job with the State, and would have gone back to work in the
construction industry with his brother as an appraiser and would have earned about
$3,000 more per year. Petitioner provided no other evidence that he sustained injury or
harm due to his reliance on the Retirement Office's annual statements." R. 370 - 373.
Stipulated Findings of Fact:6

II.

Prior to the evidentiary hearing, the parties reached a partial stipulation of facts
that was signed by counsel for both parties and was made a part of the record which
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
"14.

Petitioner has been employed with the following governmental entities:
EMPLOYER

15.

YEARS EMPLOYED

1. State of Utah
2. Davis & Weber County Canal Co.

April 15, 1989-Present
November 1, 1989 - April 30, 1993

3. West Point City

January 1, 1994-Present

Petitioner began working for the State of Utah on April 15,1989, and, is

currently a merit employee with benefits that include retirement benefits that are paid to
the URS in his behalf. The State of Utah has paid all contributions required by the PERS
6. Although these facts were stipulated to by the parties, the Hearing Officer inexplicably
did not include all of the stipulated facts in the Findings of Fact.
10

on Petitioner's behalf to the URS.
16.

Petitioner began working for West Point City on January 1, 1994, and, is

currently a merit employee with benefits that include retirement benefits that are paid to
the URS in his behalf. West Point City has paid all contributions required by the PERS
on Petitioner's behalf to the URS.
17.

Petitioner was previously employed with the Davis and Weber County

Canal Company from November 1, 1989, through April 30, 1993. The Petitioner and
Davis and Weber County Canal Company have paid all contributions required by the
PECRS on Petitioner's behalf to the URS." R. 109 - 112, R. 383 p. 7 -8.
Ill,

Additional Relevant Facts7:

Norm submits the following record evidence is also germane, important and
relevant to the issues before the Court:
18.

Marcia Stroud is Norm's Retirement Advisor at the URS and her

undisputed testimony was that all necessary contributions have been paid to the URS by
each of Norm's three (3) employers so as to qualify him for service credit for his
employment with each of those employers8 totaling thirty-two (32) years of service credit.

7. Each of the additional relevant facts numbered eighteen (18) through forty-two (42)
were proposed by Norm in his Recommended Findings of Fact (R. 324-338) and
Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law (R. 274-323). Although the Hearing Officer denied Norm's objections and proposed
Findings of Fact (R. 348-351), the Hearing Officer did not provide any analysis on insight
as to the basis for denying Norm's objections that would be of any benefit to this Court in
conducting a meaningful review on appeal.
8. During the testimony of Mr. Whitaker, the Board's counsel also stipulated to that fact
that Norm has been continuously employed by each of his employers and all necessary
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R. 383 p. 74, 79 - 80, Respondent's Exhibit 4 (R. 158). Specifically:
a.

The State of Utah has paid all necessary contributions on Norm's

behalf to the URS for Norm's 17.087 years of service credit as of May 16, 2006. R. 383
p. 60, 65, 7 9 - 8 0 , 133-134.
b.

West Point City has paid all necessary contributions on Norm's

behalf to the URS for Norm's 12.208 years of service credit as of May 16, 2006. R. 383
p. 60, 62 - 6 5 , 79 - 8 0 , 91.
c.

Norm and the County have jointly paid all necessary contributions

on Norm's behalf to the URS for Petitioner's 3.5 years of service credit as of May 16,
2006. R. 383 p. 79 - 80, 92, 133 - 134.
19.

During the cross-examination of Ms. Judy Lund, URS Retirement Director,

she acknowledged that Norm had met all the statutory requirements of the USRIBA to
receive approximately thirty-two (32) years of service credit. R. 383 p. (unavailable transcript incomplete).
20.

Norm testified that over the past five (5) years, he has received, retained,

and relied on annual statements from the URS wherein he was advised by the URS that he
had the following years of service credit incident to his employment, to-wit:
"SERVICE CREDIT PER SYSTEM AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2004
CONTRIBUTORY LOCAL GOVERNMENT [ 1 ]
3.500 YEARS
NONCONTRIBUTORY LOCAL GOVERNMENT [2]
10.834 YEARS
NONCONTRIBUTORY STATE AND SCHOOL [2]
15.654 YEARS"
See, Norm's Exhibit 2 at page 3 (R. 132); R 383 p. 137 - 138, 141 - 143.
contributions have been paid by each of Norm's employers to qualify him for his 32.795
years of earned service credit. R. 383 p. 133 - 134; R. 109 - 112.
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21.

On November 24, 2003, the URS mailed to Norm an Estimate showing the

calculation of his service credit as totaling only 17.087 years. R. 383 p. 135-137,
Respondent's Exhibit 2 (R. 155 - 156). The 2003 Retirement Estimate (showing only 3.5
years of service credit, which was crossed out by Chris Blevins and 17.087 years was
handwritten in) however, did not contain any statements regarding accuracy. See, R. 383
p. 75 - 77; Respondent's Exhibit 2 (R. 155 - 158) and compare/contrast with Norm's
Exhibit 2 (R. 130 - 137). Norm testified that based on the prior Annual Statements
accurately showing his years of service, he believed the 2003 Retirement Estimate must
have been a mistake so he took no further action at the time and continued to rely on the
subsequent Annual Statements that showed service credit for all of his participating
employers. R. 383 p. 135 - 137. Specifically, when Norm's 2004 Annual Statement
showed an accurate amount of total years of service equaling 29.998 years of service
credit, Norm believed that he had reasonably relied upon all of his prior Annual
Statements from the URS that he was receiving service credit towards retirement for each
of his jobs. See, Norm's Exhibit 2 at page 3 (R. 132), R. 383 p. 136 - 137, 144.
Accordingly, and appropriately, Norm did not make any further inquiries of the URS until
he was prepared to retire in the fall of 2005. R. 383 p. 138 - 139.
22.

When he called the Retirement Office in 2003, Norm testified he was

verbally told to simply add his years of service credit together on his Annual Retirement
Statement in order to determine his eligible years of service credit. R. 383 p. 143 - 144.
23.

When he received the Retirement Estimate in September of 2005 showing
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only 20.086 years of service credit, Norm testified that he contacted his employers to
confirm his years of service credit R. 383 p. 148 - 149. In of October 2005, Norm called
Vee Gooch, Administrative Assistant to the Manager for the Davis and Weber County
Canal Company (herein "the County"), to confirm he had received 3.5 years of service
credit with the URS for his employment with the County as well as to confirm that the
County had paid all required sums to the URS for his retirement. R. 383 p. 1 7 - 1 8 .
24.

Ms. Gooch testified that Norm's Exhibit 3 (R. 138 - 140), was a true and

correct copy of Norm's first and last paychecks which show retirement contributions were
deducted from his paycheck for the 3.5 year time period. R. 383 p. 1 4 - 1 5 .
25.

Ms. Gooch testified that after speaking with a URS employee who

identified herself as Donna Viganski verified that: 1) Norm had earned years of service
credit for his employment with the County; 2) all required payments were paid into the
retirement system for his 3.5 years of employment with the County; and, 3) that Norm
had a total of "thirty something" years of service credit with the URS and was eligible to
retire at anytime. R. 383 p. 17 - 18. Ms. Gooch testified that Donna did not tell Ms.
Gooch that this service was "unverified." Ms. Gooch relayed the forgoing information to
Norm. R.383p. 1 7 - 1 8 .
26.

Ms. Gooch's unrebutted testimony was that she relies on the information

contained in the URS' Annual Retirement Statements, identified as Norm's Exhibit 2, as
being accurate in planning for her retirement. R. 383 p. 25. The URS did not challenge
Ms. Gooch's reliance on her URS Annual Statements as being reasonable nor did they
present testimony that contradicted Ms. Gooch's testimony.
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27.

Ms. Gooch, testified that she works one (1) full time job, funded by two (2)

employers (Davis and Weber County Canal Co. and Weber River Water User's
Association). Annually, each of Ms. Gooch's employers contribute only 50% of the sums
necessary to purchase one (1) year of service credit in contradistinction to Norm's
participating employers who have each paid/purchased one (1) year of service credit for
each of Norm's jobs. R. 383 p. 18 - 49. Ms. Gooch further testified that her Annual
Retirement Statement only shows 1.0 for a year of service because each of her employers
only contribute 50% towards her retirement service credits in the contributory system,
while Norm's Annual Retirement Statement shows 1.0 for each year of service credit in
the Local Government Contributory System and an additional 1.0 year of service credit in
the State and School Contributory System. See, Norm's Exhibit 2 (R. 130 -137); R. 383
p. 2 4 - 2 6 .
28.

During the testimony of Marcia Stroud, she acknowledged that the

information contained in each Annual Retirement Statement, as illustrated by Norm's
Exhibits 1 and 2, is accurate and that members rely on the information contained in the
Annual Retirement Statement. R. 383 p. 53.
29.

Rick Davis, West Point City Manager, and Tami Suzuki, West Point City

Recorder and Human Resource Representative, each testified that in October, 2005, they
spoke with URS' employee Marcia Stroud in a telephone conversation who confirmed
that Norm had thirty-one (31) years of service credit and was eligible to retire any time.
R. 383 p. 99-100, 108-109.
30.

In her testimony, Ms. Stroud testified that she only spoke to Mr. Davis and
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not Ms. Suzuki and that a customer service technician can only give unverified years of
service credit over the phone. R. 383 p. 49 - 50, 73. Ms. Stroud acknowledged during
her testimony, however, that the URS subsequently "verified" Norm's thirty-two (32)
years of service credit. R. 383 p. 51, 72 - 74, 79 - 80.
31.

Felshaw King, West Point City Attorney, testified that on October 25, 2005,

he telephonically contacted the office of the URS and spoke with two (2) of URS'
employees - a Donna (Mr. King had received her name from Ms. Gooch's conversation
with Norm), who then transferred his call to Dustin Seeley. Upon inquiry, Mr. Seeley
accessed Norm's records on his URS computer and stated to Mr. King that "he (Norm)
has plenty of years. He has 31.495 years of service." R. 383 p. 119 - 120. Mr. King
testified that Mr. Seeley did not tell Mr. King that the years of service were "unverified."
Mr. King also testified that because Mr. Seeley had expressed to Mr. King that Norm had
plenty of years of years to retire, Mr. King requested Mr. Seelev to send him written
confirmation of his years of service credit. Mr. Seeley indicated that he could not send
him written verification but that Norm would have to request a Retirement Estimate. R.
383 p. 120.
32.

During the testimony of Mr. Seeley, he testified that he told Mr. King that

Norm had earned "approximately thirty-one (31) years of unverified service." R. 383 p.
38.
33.

During the testimony of Mr. King, he testified that based on the Annual

Statements showing Norm was entitled to retire with thirty-one (31) years of service
credit, he called and spoke with Chris Blevins and Marcia Stroud (URS personnel) to
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inquire why Norm's 2005 Retirement Estimate only showed 20.087 years of service. R.
383 p. 120-122.
34.

Mr. King testified that on November 2, 2005, he and Norm met with Ms.

Blevins and Ms. Stroud in an attempt to clear up the confusion. During this conversation,
and for the first time, URS personnel advised Norm that they believed he was not entitled
to the full amount of service credit that he had earned during his employment with each of
his employers. During this meeting, Ms. Blevins or Ms. Stroud acknowledged that even
though the full contributions were paid by Norm's employer and received by the URS for
each of Norm's jobs, Norm could only earn one (1) year of service credit in one (1)
calendar year under the URS' interpretation of U.C.A. §49-1 l-403(c). Ms. Blevins and
Ms. Stroud "agreed on everything, except the meaning and application of the statute." R.
383 p. 121-122.
35.

Mr. King testified that during the November 2, 2005, meeting either Ms.

Blevins or Ms. Stroud acknowledged that the URS "no longer sent out that kind of
information on their statements" identified in Norm's Exhibits 1 and 2. R. 383 p. 121.
36.

During the testimony of Ms. Stroud, she acknowledged that Norm's

situation is an unusual case and that she has not encountered another similar situation
(involving more than one full time employer) before or after Norm's case. R. 383 p. 89.
37.

Mr. Seeley testified that he had not encountered a situation with more than

one full time employer prior to Norm. R. 383 p. 47.
38.

During Ms. Lund's twenty-five (25) year career with the URS, she testified

that there have "not been a handful" but "less than ten (10) employees," who had worked
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two (2) full time positions during the same time period. Ms. Lund would not, however,
identify or name any specific employees who were similarly situated to Norm. R. 383 p.
(unavailable - transcript incomplete).
39.

Norm testified he understood and believed that his employment with West

Point City, a full time position with benefits, and his employment with the Juvenile
Courts, with the State of Utah, a full time position with benefits, each would individually
count towards his years of service credit towards retirement. R. 383 p. 135-137. The
Annual Statements Norm received confirmed Norm's understanding. R. 130 -138; R.
383 p. 137-138.
40.

Without objection, Mr. King testified that when the URS accepted and

"received credits and the payments from two employers, I would assume that your
actuaries [the URS] would have taken that into account"... "assuming that your actuaries
were functioning properly that they would have taken into account the fact that they were
receiving benefits from two different employers for the same employee and that would
have been factored into the system." R. 383 p. 124 - 126.
41.

On cross-examination and without objection, Mr. Davis testified that based

on his prior experience in working as a Public Relations Director with Beneficial Life for
six (6) years and as a fiscal performance auditor in the Office of the Auditor General for
the State of Arizona for one and one-half (IV2) years, he opined that it would be illegal
and immoral for the URS to accept two (2) premiums and pay one (1) benefit. R. 383 p.
114.
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42.

During her testimony, Ms. Lund acknowledged the URS did not have any

documentation or evidence from any URS actuary which would demonstrate any negative
actuarial impact that might accrue in the event Norm were granted his full 32.795 years of
service credit. R. 383 p. (unavailable - transcript incomplete). Additionally, neither Ms.
Lund nor any other URS personnel requested the URS' actuary to perform any
calculations to determine what actuarial impact would accrue, if any, in the event Norm
received the full benefit of his 32.795 years of service credit. Ms. Lund further
acknowledged that, if the URS actuary subsequently determined that granting Norm's
requested relief were to create any actuarial soundness issue, the URS could then seek an
increase in participating employer contributions from the Legislature to resolve the issue.
R. 383 p. (unavailable - transcript incomplete).
IV
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I: In Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401 (3)(a)(2005), the Legislature has clearly stated
its intent that an employee "shall receive service credit for the term of employment
provided that all contributions are paid to the office." It is undisputed that the URS has
been paid all contributions required under the USRIBA and owed by Norm's employers.
Despite the foregoing mandate and having been folly paid, the USRB nevertheless
interpreted Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401 (3)(c) to preclude Norm from receiving all of his
years of earned service credit in reliance on the last sentence contained in Utah Code
Ann. §49-1 l-401(3)(c):
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"(3) In the accrual of service credit, the following provisions
apply:
.. .(c) The board shall fix the minimum time per day, per
month, and per year upon the basis of which one year of
service and proportionate parts of a year shall be credited
toward qualification for retirement. Service may be computed
on a fiscal or calendar year basis and portions of years served
shall be accumulated and counted as service. In any event, all
of the service rendered in any one fiscal or calendar year may
not count for more than one year." Utah Code Ann. §49-11401(3)(c)(2005) (Emphasis supplied).
Norm respectfully submits that the emphasized language in Utah Code Ann. §491 l-401(3)(c)(2005) is ambiguous because it can reasonably be read in more than one
fashion, to-wit: 1) Norm's Position: the statute should be liberally construed to allow for
one (1) year of service credit to be earned in a one (1) year time period from "each
employer"; 2) or the URS' Position: the statute should be narrowly interpreted and
construed to be a limitation on an employee's ability to only earn one (1) year of service
credit from "all employers" regardless of whether the employee (Norm) works two (2)
full-time positions. Norm submits that his Position is consistent with the Legislature's
intent that the USRIBA "shall be liberally construed to provided maximum benefits and
protections consistent with sound fiduciary and actuarial principles." See, Utah Code
Ann. 49-11-103 (2002).
POINT II:

It is undisputed that Norm worked twenty (20) or more hours per week for

his second employer but these years of service credit are "ineligible" under the USRB's
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §49-1 l-401(3)(c)(2005). R. 109 - 12; R. 383 p. 60, 62
- 65, 74, 79 - 80, 91, 133 - 134. Thus, under Utah Code Ann. §49-13-302 (2002), Norm
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or his employer may purchase such "ineligible" service credit in accordance with Utah
Code Ann. §49-11-403(3)(2006). Because Norm's second employer has (over the past
fifteen (15) years) already paid the required contributions on Norm's behalf, Norm
respectfully submits that this Court should determine those paid and received
contributions satisfy the purchase requirement of Utah Code Ann. §49-11-403(3) (2006)
thereby permitting him to retire with his full 32.795 years.
Alternatively, 15.708 years of Norm's ineligible, but earned and paid, service
credit should qualify as "forfeited" service credit under the USRIBA. Utah Code Ann.
§49-11-403(l)(d) allows an employer or employee to purchase such forfeited service
credit if the employee does not qualify for an allowance based on the service credit.
Thus, the USRB erred by refusing to permit Norm to purchase his forfeited years of
service credit.
POINT III: In Eldredge v. Utah Sate Retirement Board, 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990), this Court adopted a three (3) part test a party must demonstrate to invoke the
doctrine of equitable estoppel. Norm met the three part Eldredge test: 1) The URS made
both written and oral representations to Norm which misled Norm to believe that he was
receiving full years of service credit for each of his full time positions and the URS now
inconsistently asserts that Norm is only entitled to receive years of service credit for one
of his positions; 2) Norm reasonably relied on the Annual Statements he received from
the URS, which showed that he was receiving full years of service credit for both of his
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positions9 (R. 383 p. 135, 141); and 3) Norm will be substantially harmed by receiving a
substantially reduced retirement benefit.
POINT IV: The USRB failed to maintain an adequate record of the entire
evidentiary hearing held below and therefore has deprived Norm of his due process right
to effective appellate review by this Court. The transcript of the hearing is insufficient
because (1) it does not contain the complete testimony of Judy Lund, Retirement Director
for URS or any of Norm's counsel's cross-examination of Ms. Lund and (2) the quality of
the tape is of extremely poor quality (the court reporter identifies over fifty (50) times that
the testimony is "inaudible"). The failure to maintain an adequate record constitutes a
violation of Norm's due process rights under United States Constitution Amendment 14,
Section 1 and Utah Constitution Article 1, Section 7. See, West Valley City v. Roberts,
1999 UT App 358, |14, 993 P.2d 252; Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney. 818 P.2d
23, 27 (Utah Ct.App. 1991).

9. See, Norman's Exhibits 1 and 2 (R. 112 - 137) attached as Exhibit I and J to the
Addendum.
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ARGUMENT
I
THE USRB ERRED BY NARROWLY INTERPRETING
UTAH CODE ANN. §49-11-401 (3)(c) & (e) IN A MANNER
CONTRADICTORY TO THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT
THAT THE USRIBA BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED IN
FAVOR OF AWARDING MAXIMUM BENEFITS AND
PROTECTIONS TO NORM.
It is undisputed that Norm has lawfully earned over thirty-two (32) years of service
credit under Section 49-11-401 (3)(a) of the USRIBA10, which mandates as follows:
"(3) In the accrual of service credit, the following
provisions apply:...
(a) A person employed and compensated by a
participating employer who meets the eligibility
requirements for membership in a system or the Utah
Governors' and Legislators' Retirement Plan shall11
receive service credit for the term of the employment
provided that all required contributions are paid to the
office," Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-401 (3)(a)(2005)
(emphasis supplied).
The USRB's Decision held, however, that Section 49-1 l-401(3)(c) of the
USRIBA, constitutes a limitation on the service credit that can be earned under Section
49-11-403(a) in reliance on the last sentence of subsection (c), to-wit:
... (c) The board shall fix the minimum time per day,
per month, and per year upon the basis of which one
year of service and proportionate parts of a year shall
10. See, Statements of Fact 18 (a-c), 19, 30, 32, and 42 hereinabove.
11. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that the word "shall" is presumed to be
mandatory. See, Push v. Draper City, 2005 UT 12, ^13,114 P.3d 546, 549 (Utah 2005),
Paarv. Stubbs, 2005 UT App 310, f7, 117 P.3d 1079,1081. Thus, the URS has
absolutely no discretion to ignore this requirement.
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be credited toward qualification for retirement. Service
may be computed on a fiscal or calendar year basis and
portions of years served shall be accumulated and
counted as service. In any event, all of the service
rendered in any one fiscal or calendar year may not
count for more than one year." Utah Code Ann. §491 l-401(3)(c) (2005) (Emphasis supplied).
Norm respectfully submits, however, that the USRB's interpretation of Section
401(3)(c) is inconsistent with, and contradictory to, the Legislature's intent that the
USRIBA should be interpreted to maximize benefits:
"49-11-103. Purpose - Liberal construction.
(2) This title shall be liberally construed to provide
maximum benefits and protections consistent with sound
fiduciary and actuarial principals.12" (Emphasis supplied).
The Utah Supreme Court has previously held that retirement statutes should be
liberally construed in favor of the employee:
"Furthermore, "pension statutes are liberally construed in
favor of the pensioner." Id. at 431-32, 142 P.2d at 663. The
interpretation defendants would have us give the language of
the 1983 amendment is as confused and unreasonable as it is
oppressive to plaintiff pensioners." Johnson v. Utah State
Retirement Board, 770 P.2d 93, 98 (Utah 1988).

12. No contradictory evidence was presented by the URS at the evidentiary hearing
below that Norm's interpretation of the USRIBA is inconsistent with sound fiduciary and
actuarial principles. The URS did not call any actuary as a witness at the evidentiary
hearing below nor present any competent or written evidence that the USRB's
interpretation of the USRIBA is consistent with sound actuarial principals. Significantly,
Judy Lund could not identify any significant cost to the USRB if Norm were to receive
his requested years of service credit nor did she consult with the URS' actuary on this
issue. See, Statement of Fact No. 42 hereinabove; R. 383 p. (unavailable - transcript
incomplete).
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Ten (10) years later, in Justice Wilkins' dissent in O'Keefe v. Utah State
Retirement Board, 929 P.2d 1112, 1118 (Utah Ct.App. 1996)(cert granted, aff d on other
grounds), 956 P.2d 279 (Utah 1998), he noted as follows:
"The Utah State Retirement Act mandates that Title 49, which
includes the PSRA, "shall be liberally construed to provide
maximum benefits and protections." Id. § 49-1-102(2)
(1994). Therefore, the plain language of the act requires that
maximum benefits and protections be construed in favor of
the system's beneficiaries. See Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co.
853 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993) (" The primary rule of
statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the
legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to
achieve.' " (quoting Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 115
(Utah 1991))). Petitioner is among those beneficiaries." Id.
(Emphasis supplied).
For the reasons set fort below, Norm respectfully submits the USRB's
interpretation of §401(3)(c) as a limitation on Norm's years of service credit for all
employers is inconsistent with the clear legislative intent that the USRIBA is to be
interpreted to provide the maximum possible benefits to participants such as Norm and
therefore the USRB's interpretation should be rejected by this Court.
A.
The USRB has not Provided any Written Documentation that its Statutory
Interpretation Promotes Uniformity or Actuarial Soundness and the USRB's
Decision is Therefore Not Entitled to Deference
In Sindt v. Retirement Board, 2007 UT 16, \ 5, 570 Utah Adv. Rep. 71, the Utah
Supreme Court has recently held the USRB's statutory interpretation of the USRIBA is
reviewed under the correction of error standard in the absence of written documentation
in the record demonstrating its interpretation promotes uniformity or actuarial soundness:
"The legislature has granted discretion to the Board only if it
"provides written documentation which demonstrates that the
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interpretation or definition promotes uniformity in the
administration of the systems or maintains the actuarial
soundness of the systems, plans or programs." Id. Utah Code
Ann. §49-l-203(l)(k) (2002). Additionally, courts will grant
deference only if the Board's interpretation or definition is
plausible and consistent with the plain language of the statute.
In this case, the Board has not provided any documentation
that its statutory interpretation promotes uniformity or
actuarial soundness. Thus, the Board's decision is not entitled
to deference. Absent a grant of discretion, we review the
Board's application or interpretation of a statute as a question
of law under the correction-of-error standard. Morton Int'l
Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581. 589 (Utah 1991)."
Id. (Emphasis supplied).
The USRB did not provide any competent evidence or written documentation in
the record or during the evidentiary hearing below regarding uniformity or actuarial
soundness as required in Sindt v. Retirement Board at f 5. The USRB's Decision and
interpretation of the USRIBA is not entitled to any deference in these appellate
proceedings.
B.
The Potential Statutory Limitation of §401(3)(c) Is Ambiguous and Should be
Interpreted in Favor of Awarding Maximum Benefits in Behalf of Norm
Norm respectfully submits that the potential13 statutory limitation regarding years

13. The purported limitation of one (1) year of service credit per calendar/fiscal year is
arguably inapplicable because Norm is not transferring years of service credit between
systems. The purported limitations of §401(3)(c) applies to situations when the employee
is transferring service credit between systems (e.g. from contributory to noncontributory
or public safety). These situations are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar where,
in a twelve (12) month time period, Norm worked two (2) full time jobs for two (2)
employers; each employer is a participating employer in the noncontributory state system;
and each employer paid the full retirement contribution to purchase one (1) year of
service credit for a total of (2) years of service credit for every twelve (12) month time
period.
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of service credit contained in Utah Code Ann. §49-11-40 l(3)(c)14 of the USRIBA is
ambiguous15 due to an omission in the last sentence that does not explicitly define
whether the limitation applies to one (1) year of service credit from each employer or one
(1) year of service credit from all employers. Utah Code Ann. §49-1 l-401(3)(c) (2005)
currently provides as follows:
"(3) In the accrual of service credit, the following provisions
apply:
.. .(c) The board shall fix the minimum time per day, per
month, and per year upon the basis of which one year of
service and proportionate parts of a year shall be credited
toward qualification for retirement. Service may be computed
on a fiscal or calendar year basis and portions of years served
shall be accumulated and counted as service. In any event, all
of the service rendered in any one fiscal or calendar year may
not count for more than one year." Utah Code Ann.
§401(3)(c) (2005) (Emphasis supplied).

14. Section 401(3)(e) has the same ambiguity, therefore the same analysis as to (3)(c)
applies to (3)(e), to-wit:
"A member may not accrue more than one year of service credit per fiscal
or calendar year [for each employer] [for all employers] as determined by
the office." Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401 (3)(e).
15. In Utah jurisprudence, a statute is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one (1)
logical meaning within the statutory scheme. See, Utah Public Employees Association v.
State of Utah, 2006 UT 9,160, 131 P.3d 208; Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231,
233 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). Further, where there is ambiguity in a statute, or it is
susceptible to two (2) interpretations (one unconstitutional), the Court is bound to choose
the interpretation which would uphold the statute as constitutional. See, Norville v. State
TaxComrrfn, 97 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1940). It is evident that Section 401 (3)(c) can be
read by reasonable persons with, at least, two (2) different meanings, and is therefore
ambiguous.
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Norm asserts that the emphasized last sentence in Section 401(3)(c) should be
interpreted to apply to a Member's employment with each participating employer and
would, thus, be interpreted as follows:
"(3) In the accrual of service credit, the following provisions
apply:
.. .(c) The board shall fix the minimum time per day, per
month, and per year upon the basis of which one year of
service and proportionate parts of a year shall be credited
toward qualification for retirement. Service may be computed
on a fiscal or calendar year basis and portions of years served
shall be accumulated and counted as service. In any event, all
of the service rendered [for each employer] in any one fiscal
or calendar year may not count for more than one year."
(Bracketed language and emphasis supplied).
Norm also posits that his interpretation is consistent with the Legislature's liberal
construction mandate regarding the USRIBA because it provides the "maximum benefits"
to Norm16 and is consistent with the USRIBA's statutory definition of service credit as
accruing from one employer.17

16. The USRB's interpretation of service credit completely deprives Norman of the
benefit of over fifteen (15) years of service - when he gets to retire - and significantly
reduces the amount he will receive when he retires. For example, Norm will suffer a nine
percent (9%) reduction in his benefit if he retires at age sixty-two (62) under Utah Code
Ann. §49-13-402(2)(b) (2005) because he does not have at least 30 years of service credit.
Thus, the URS' refusal to recognize all of Norm's earned and paid years of service credit
actually penalizes him twice - once for his loss of some 15.708 years of service credit and
second for the actuarial reduction of nine percent (9%) he suffers under Utah Code Ann.
§49-13-402(2)(b)(2005).
17. The USRIBA defines service credit as employment with one employer, to-wit:
"§49-11-102 ...(38) "Service credit" means
(a) the period during which an employee is employed and compensated by
a participating employer and meets the eligibility requirements for
28

Rather than properly factoring in the Legislature's mandate to "maximize benefits"
for Norm, the USRB has instead taken a position that minimizes Norm's benefits by
interpreting Section 401 (3)(c) as follows:
"(3) In the accrual of service credit, the following provisions apply:
... (c) The board shall fix the minimum time per day, per
month, and per year upon the basis of which one year of
service and proportionate parts of a year shall be credited
toward qualification for retirement. Service may be computed
on a fiscal or calendar year basis and portions of years served
shall be accumulated and counted as service. In any event, all
of the service rendered [for all employers] in any one fiscal or
calendar year may not count for more than one year."
(Bracketed and emphasized language supplied).
In this case, Norm submits the USRIBA's purpose is to "provide maximum
benefits and protections"18 to Norm and this Court should so hold by rejecting the
USRB's interpretation of §401(3)(c) because it improperly and unnecessarily limits
Norm's "benefits and protections" under the USRIBA. Further, under Sindt v.
Retirement Board at ^ 5, the USRB has not demonstrated any actuarial soundness or
uniformity premise which might potentially underpin its "minimizing" statutory

membership in a system or the Utah Governors' and Legislators' Retirement
Plan, provided that any required contributions are paid to the office; and
(b) periods of time otherwise purchasable under this title."
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-102 (38) (2005) (Emphasis supplied).
18. Furthermore, when a statute is ambiguous, the proper interpretation is the one which
best harmonizes the statute's general purpose. UPEA v. State of Utah, at f 37 fh. 36
quoting Murphy v. Crosland, 886 P.2d 74, 80 (Utah Ct.App. 1994).
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interpretation so as to overcome the Legislature's liberal construction mandate in favor of
"maximizing benefits" to and for Norm.
II
THE USRB ERRED BY DETERMINING THAT UTAH
CODE ANN. §49-ll-401(3)(C) DOES NOT EFFECT AN
"INELIGIBLE" OR "FORFEITURE" STATUS
REGARDING NORM'S 32,795 YEARS OF SERVICE
CREDIT
In the case at bar, the USRB is substantively requesting this Court to ignore the
fact that all required contributions have been paid (for the corresponding years of service
credit) on behalf of Norm such that he is statutorily eligible to receive over thirty-two
(32) years of service credit under Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401 (3)(a)(2005). By only
accepting 17.087 years of Norm's earned service credit, however, the USRB is ignoring
the provision of Utah Code Ann. §49-13-302(2002) in which the Legislature allowed for
the purchase of years of service credit when an employee works twenty (20) or more
hours per week for a participating employer but is not eligible for service credit based on
that service. Thus, the USRB's Decision substantively effects a forfeiture of Norm's
fifteen (15) years of service credit that he has earned and for which the URS has been
fully paid by Norm's employers.
A.
The USRB Erroneously Determined that Norm Does not Have any Forfeited
Credit
In its Decision, the USRB determined that Norm does not have any forfeited
service credit:
"[Conclusion No.] 3. Petitioner is not entitled to
purchase service credit under the provisions of Utah

•0

Code Ann. §49-11-403 because he has no forfeited
service credit.
[Conclusion No.] 4. All retirement contributions from
all employers of the Petitioner received by the
Retirement Office will be used in calculating his
retirement benefit at the time he retires." R. 374.
Although the USRB's conclusions of law are not factual findings requiring
marshaling, as a matter of caution, Norm's counsel will marshal the evidence in support
of the USRB's conclusions numbered 3 and 4 as follows:
1.
USRB Retirement Advisor Marcia Stroud and
URS Retirement Director Judy Lund testified that the
USRB combined Norm's salary from each of his
current employers in computing his retirement benefit.
R. 383 p. 61 - 63, 67, 79 - 82, 89-92, 162, 164-166;
Respondent's Exhibit 4 (R. 158).
2.
Ms. Stroud testified that Norm will receive a
"supplemental benefit" based on his 3.5 years of
employment with Davis & Weber County Canal Co.
because those years were in the Contributory System
as opposed to being under the Noncontributory
System. R. 383 p. 61, 92.
For the reasons set forth in more detail in sections two (2) through four (4)
hereinbelow, viewed in favor of the USRB's Decision, the marshaled evidence does not
support the USRB's Conclusion that Norm has no forfeited service credit.
B,

Purchase of Non Qualifying Service Credit Under §49-13-302 of the USRIBA
The Legislature has provided that when a Member works twenty (20) or more

hours per week for a participating employer (but does not meet the other eligibility
requirements for years of service credit), the Member may purchase those years of service
credit:
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"49-13-302. Purchase of service credit
Any member who works 20 or more hours per week for a
participating employer participating in this system, but does
not meet other eligibility requirements for service credit, may
purchase such service credit in accordance with Section 4911-403." Utah Code Ann. §49-13-302 (2002).
The USRB's "minimizing" interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401 (3)(c)
prohibits Norm from accruing more than one (1) year of service credit in one (1) calendar
year. Norm is thus ineligible for any year of service credit earned in his second full time
position in the same calendar year. Norm is thus permitted under Utah Code Ann. §4913-302(2002) to purchase that "ineligible" service credit earned from his second full time
position.
To that end, the Legislature has (in the USRIBA) permitted a member (e.g., Norm)
or a participating employer (e.g., the State of Utah and West Point City) to individually,
separately or jointly purchase years of such "ineligible" service credit as follows:
"49-11-403. Purchase of public service credit not
otherwise qualifying for benefit.
(3)(a) To purchase credit under this section, the member, a
participating employer, or member and a participating
employer jointly shall make payment to the system under
which the member is currently covered.
(b) The amount of the payment shall be determined by
the office based on a formula that is:
(i) recommended by the actuary; and
(ii) adopted by the board...."
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-403(3) (2006) (Emphasis supplied).
Inasmuch as the URS has already been folly paid for all of the years of service
credit from both of Norm's foil time positions, Norm would respectfully request this
Court determine that said circumstance constitutes a purchase of the foil service credits
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under Section 49-11-403(3). Norm would then be entitled to implement that purchase by
merely filling out any appropriate forms as may be required by the USRB under §49-11403 and, thereafter, be folly eligible to retire with his hard earned thirty-two (32) years of
service credit.
C.

Purchase of Forfeited Service Credit
Assuming, arguendo, that the Court concludes Norm is precluded by Utah Code

Ann. §49-l-401(3)(c) from including all of Norm's years of service credit in calculating
his benefit, Norm submits he is also qualified to purchase these years of service credit as
"forfeited credit."19 The USRB concluded below, as a matter of law, that Norm "has not
forfeited service credit" because "all retirement contributions from all employers of the
Petitioner received by the Retirement office will be used in calculating his retirement
benefit at the time he retires." R. 374. (USRB Decision Conclusion no. 3 and 4).
The fatal flaw to the USRB's legal conclusion is that it once again ignores the
plain language of the retirement statute as follows:
"49-11-403. Purchase of public service credit not
otherwise qualifying for benefit.
(1) A member, a participating employer, or a member and a
participating employer jointly may purchase service credit
equal to a period of the member's employment in the
following:
(d) forfeited service credit in this state if the member
does not qualify for an allowance based on the service credit;
19. It is well-established that forfeitures are generally not favored by the law. See,
generally, Forsgren v. Sollie, 659 P.2d 1068, 1069 (Utah 1983); Russell v. Park City Utah
Corp., 506 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1973). The Legislature obviously intended to rectify
this fundamental unfairness by its enactment of Utah Code Ann. §49-11-403(1) (2006)
that allows the purchase of "forfeited" years of service credit.
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... Utah Code Ann. §49-11-403(1) (2006) (Emphasis
Supplied).
Utah Code Ann. §49-1 l-403(l)(d) provides that forfeited service credit may be
purchased for years of service credit "if the member does not qualify for an allowance
based on the service credit/'20 (Emphasis supplied) Although Norm may receive some
partial benefit based on his combined salary, he is certainly not receiving any
allowance/benefit based on the 15.708 of his years of earned service credit from his
second full time position and those forfeited years of service credit should therefore
qualify under Section 49-1 l-403(l)(d) to be purchased by Norm and/or his employer(s).
This much cannot be disputed by the USRB - Norm has worked at two (2) full
time positions for two (2) participating employers but the USRB will only recognize his
years of service credit for one (1) of his employers. Thus, since both of Norm's full time
positions have resulted in the accrual of years of service credit under Utah Code Ann. §
49-11-401 (3)(a) (2005),21 Norm submits the USRB cannot logically assert that Norm's
years of service credit from his second full time position have been forfeited by the
USRB. Moreover, but for the USRB's "minimizing" interpretation §401(3)(c), Norm
would be entitled to 32.795 years of service credit for the work performed on behalf of
each of his employers.

20. Therefore the USRB's partial factoring of Norm's salary from both of his current
employers is irrelevant to the issue of how many years service credit have been forfeited
because there is no mention of salary or final average salary in the purchase of service
credit statute.
21. See, page 23 hereinabove for the entire text of this subsection. This subsection is
also set forth and highlighted in Exhibit B to the Addendum.
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D.

The USRB's Windfall
Since the USRB has received all required contributions from Norm's employers as

required under § 49-1 l-401(3)(a) for Norm's thirty-two (32) years of service credit and the
USRB has not refunded any excess contributions received from either of Norm's employers,
Norm submits the same constitutes an admission by the USRB that there are no errors regarding
the accrual of Norm's years of service credit or the payment of his employers' contributions. If
there had been an error, the USRB would most certainly have honored its fiduciary duties by
returning Norm's employers' overpayment of contributions in his behalf has provided in the
USRIBA:
"49-11-607. Determination of benefits-Errors in records
or calculations - Correction of errors by the office,
(3).. .(c) If excess contributions have been received by
the office, the contributions shall be refunded to the
participating employer or member which paid the
contributions." Utah Code Ann. §49-1 K607f3Vri T2003)
(Emphasis supplied).
Thus, refusing to credit Norm with his full years of service credit based on the
USRB's receipt of full employer contributions or returning those contributions paid by
West Point City and the State of Utah for which no benefits will ever be paid to Norm or
anyone else, the USRB has obtained a windfall benefit and the excess contributions it has
received from Norm's employers are simply absorbed into the PECRS. Norm, on the
other hand, will suffer a nine percent (9%) actuarial reduction22 in his monthly retirement

22. See, Utah Code Ann. §49-13-402(2)(b) (2005), which imposes a three percent (3%)
penalty for each year an employee is under the age of sixty-five (65), if he/she has less
than thirty (30) years of service credit. If Norm received his full years of service credit,
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benefit that results in his only receiving a retirement benefit equal to twenty-five percent
(25%)23 of his final average salary instead of the sixty-four percent (64%) monthly
allowance he should receive from his hard earned work for his employers.
Ill
THE USRB ERRED BY DETERMINING THAT
EQUITABLE ESTOPEL DOES NOT APPLY IN
THIS CASE
A.

Challenged Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Estoppel
Appellate review of the USRB's application of the facts to the legal standard of

equitable estoppel is a mixed question of fact and law which is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion with deference afforded to the factual findings of the USRB.24 Norm
challenges the following factual findings and conclusions of law contained in the USRB's
Decision:
Finding of Fact No. 13:
"Petitioner testified that had he known in 199A that he could not
he would not suffer this actuarial penalty.
23. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §49-12-402(2)(a)(ii) (2005) and §49-13-402(2)(a)
(2002), Norm's retirement benefit is calculated by multiplying two percent (2%) by the
years of service credit and multiply that number by the employee's final average monthly
salary. Norm's thirty-two (32) years of service credit thus qualify him for a benefit equal
to sixty-four percent (64%) of his final average salary. However, by the USRB's
calculations, Norm will only receive a benefit by multiplying two percent (2%) times
17.087 years of service credit resulting in a total of thirty-four percent (34%) of Norm's
final average salary that is reduced by a nine percent (9%) actuarial deduction (see,
footnote 22) for a twenty-five percent (25%) benefit of his final average salary rather than
a benefit equal to sixty-four percent (64%) of his final average salary.
24. See, Trolley Square Associates v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct.App. 1994);
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah Ct.App. 1991); Eldredge v.
Utah State Retirement Board, 795 P.2d 671, 674-5 (Utah Ct.App. 1990).
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count toward his retirement two years of service credit for each year
that he worked for two employers, he would have accepted another
position with West Point City, would have resigned his job with the
State, and would have gone back to work in the construction industry
with his brother as an appraiser and would have earned about
$3,000.00 more per year. Petitioner provided no other evidence that
he sustained injury or harm due to his reliance on the Retirement
Office's annual statements."25 R. 372 - 373.
Conclusion No. 6:
"Even if Petitioner could have proven an "unusual circumstance"
against the Board, Petitioner failed to prove sufficient grounds to
prevail on any claim for equitable estoppel against the Board. The
elements of equitable estoppel are:
(1) a statement, admission, act or failure to act by one party
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or
inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the first party's
statement, admission, act or failure to act; and (3) injury to the
second party that would result from allowing the first party to
contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to
act.
Holland v. Career Service Review Bd, 856 P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App,
1993)." R. 374.
Conclusion No. 7:
"Although Petitioner misunderstood when he would be able to retire,
the undisputed facts do not give rise to an unusual circumstance to
prevail on an estoppel claim against the Retirement System. None of
the annual statements gave Petitioner a "total" amount of his service
credit and each statement advised him to contact the Retirement
Office if he was employed by two or more employers at the same
time. Because he failed to do so, his reliance on his interpretation of
the amounts on the annual statements was not reasonable, and he did
not suffer any damage because of any reliance.
When Petitioner first contacted the Retirement Office in 2003, he
was correctly told that he would have 17.087 years of service credit
as of May 16,2006. Petitioner failed to contact the Retirement
25. Petitioner only challenges the underlined portions of the disputed findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
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Office again until September 2005 when he requested another
estimate with a three year military purchase. Petitioner was then told
that he would have 20.087 years of service credit as of May 16,
2006, if he made a military service purchase. Although Petitioner
was verbally informed in mid-October 2005 by a Retirement Office
customer service representative that he had over 31 years of
"unverified" service credit, the Retirement Office quickly corrected
such a statement, and on November 2, 2006, the Retirement Office
clearly informed Petitioner that he could not receive more than one
year of service credit for one year of actual work.
These facts do not rise to the level of an "unusual circumstance" to
create an estoppel against the Board as a governmental entity.
Further, Petitioner proved no reasonable reliance on the Board's
statements, nor did he prove damages to prevail on a claim for
estoppel against the Board. Therefore, there are insufficient grounds
to support an estoppel against the Board." R. 374 - 375.
Before addressing the elements of estoppel, Norni will marshal the evidence
supporting the USRB's Decision regarding estoppel as follows:
1.
On November 24, 2003, the URS sent Norm an Estimate
showing the calculation of his service credit as of May 16, 2006,
totaling only 17.087 years. R. 383 p. 55 - 56, 74 - 77, 86, 136;
Respondent's Exhibit's 1 and 2 (R. 154 - 156). Norm received the
2003 Retirement Estimate, which he believed to be inaccurate but
did not contact the URS again until 2005. R. 383 p. 145 - 146.
2.
On September 14, 2005, the URS, at Norm's request, sent
Norm a Retirement Estimate showing an estimate of his retirement
benefits based on calculation of his service credit. The 2005
Retirement Estimate included a three year military service purchase
but showed only 20.087 years of service credit contrary to Norm's
2004 Annual Retirement Statement. R. 383 p. 77 - 80; Norm's
Exhibit 4 (R. 141 - 144); Respondent's Exhibit 3 (R. 157).
3.
Marcia Stroud, Norm's Retirement Benefits Advisor for the
URS, testified that in 2005 she only spoke to Rick Davis about Mr.
Whitaker and that she was "certain" she never spoke with Ms.
Suzuki. Further, Ms. Stroud testified that she informed Mr. Davis
that Norm did not have enough service credits for thirty-one (31)
years of service credit based on the 2003 estimate. R. 383 p. 93.
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4.
Dustin Seeley, Retirement Advisor for the URS, testified that
in 2005 he did not tell Mr. King that Norm had "plenty of years" to
retire but that Mr. Whitaker had "unverified service of approximately
thirty-one (31) years." R. 383 p. 38 - 39.
5.
On November 2, 2005, Mr. King and Norm met with URS
employees, Chris Blevins (Ms. Stroud's supervisor at URS), and Ms.
Stroud in an attempt to clear up the confusion. During this
conversation, Ms. Blevins and Ms. Stroud advised Norm that they
believed he was not entitled to the full amount of service credit that
he had earned during his employment with each of his employers.
During this meeting, Ms. Blevins or Ms. Stroud expressed that even
though the full contributions were made and received for each of
Norm's jobs, under the URS' interpretation of U.C.A. §49-11401(3)(c), Norm could only earn one (1) year of service credit in one
(1) calendar year. As Mr. King testified, Ms. Blevins and Ms.
Stroud "agreed on everything, except the meaning and application
of the statute." Although Mr. King tried to explain to URS personnel
that he believed they were relying on a statute that was inapplicable
to Norm's circumstances, they were adamant in their position and
refused to discuss potential resolution of the matter. R. 383 p. 69 70,120-122.
6.
The Annual Statements sent out by the Retirement Office
include total service for each of Norm's employers but do not add up
each of Norm's employer's totals such that they do not provide a
grand total number of years of service credit. R. 383 p. 117, Norm's
Exhibit 2 (R. 130-137).
7.
The Annual Statements sent out by the Retirement Office
include the following notification:
"To determine a monthly allowance estimate go to the Utah
Retirement System web site at www.urs.org and click on the
Retirement Benefit Estimate Calculator link. Follow the guides and
use information from this and previous statements to determine an
estimated allowance.
If you are a member in more than one Retirement System, if you are
a part-time elected or appointed official, or if you are employed with
two or more employers at the same time, you will need to contact the
Retirement Office." (Emphasis supplied) Norm's Exhibit 2 (R. 130
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-137); R. 383 p. 53.
For the reasons set forth in more detail in Section "B" hereinbelow, viewed in
favor of the USRB's Decision, the marshaled evidence does not support the USRB's
Decision that the facts are insufficient to create an estoppel against the USRB.
B.
The Facts Warrant the Application of Estoppel Against the USRB in Favor of
Norm
1.

Estoppel is Appropriate Against the USRB as a Governmental Agency
Acting in a Proprietary Capacity

The elements of equitable estoppel are:
"The elements essential to invoke equitable estoppel are: (1) a
statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action
or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the first
party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3)
injury to the second party that would result from allowing the
first party to contradict or repudiate such statement,
admission, act, or failure to act. CECO Corp. v. Concrete
Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989); Celebrity
Club, 602 P.2d at 694; Utah Dep 't of Transp. v. Reagan
Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 751 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah Ct. App.
1988)." Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board. 795 P.2d
671, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
As a general rule, the Utah Courts have held that equitable estoppel may only be invoked
against the State where it is in the interests of justice to do so and have imposed a more
stringent test applicable to governmental agencies:
"As a general rule under case law, the doctrine of estoppel is
not assertable against the state and its agencies. Utah State
Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982). Utah
courts have, however, carved out an exception to this general
common law rule in unusual circumstances "where it is plain
that the interest of justice so require." Id. at 720; see, e.g.,
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm 'n, 602
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P.2d 689 (Utah 1979). "In cases where such an issue arises,
the critical inquiry is whether it appears that the facts may be
found with such certainty, and the injustice to be suffered is of
sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception." Utah State Univ.,
646P.2dat720." Id.
In Eldredge, this Court held, however, that the USRB has a duty to refrain from giving
inaccurate or misleading information:26
"Two other considerations not present in Celebrity Club
strengthen Eldredge's case for estoppel. The critical nature
of the irrevocable, once-in-a-lifetime retirement decision of a
public employee imposes a strict duty of certitude upon those
charged with the supervision and implementation of the
system. "[A1 governmental body, charged with as important
a function as the administration of a public employees
retirement system, bears a most stringent duty to abstain
from giving inaccurate or misleading advice." Nevada
Public Employees Retirement Bd. v. Byrne, 96 Nev. 276, 607
P.2d 1351, 1353 (1980)." Id. at 676. (Emphasis supplied).
In Eldredge, Judge Jackson further opined that the less stringent equitable estoppel test
applicable to individuals governs disputes between the USRB and its members:
"In addition, as noted in Celebrity Club, 602 P.2d at 694,
the courts must be more cautious in applying equitable
estoppel against the State when it is functioning in a
governmental, as opposed to a proprietary, capacity. Here,
the fUtah State Retirement] Board was exercising a
26. The USRB had not heretofore disputed that it has a duty to refrain from giving
inaccurate or misleading information or that it acts in a proprietary manner and the Utah
Courts will apply a less stringent equitable estoppel test. See, Eldredge v. Utah State
Retirement Board, 795 P.2d 671, 675-7 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) The USRB determined in
Conclusion Number 7 that the Board is a governing entity and the facts do not rise to the
level of "unusual circumstances." In light of Eldredge, the higher standard of estoppel
against governmental entity does not apply. Nonetheless, Norm also meets the higher
standard of estoppel against governmental entities acting in a governmental capacity that
there must be unusual circumstance is also met and will be addressed in more detail in
section five (5) hereinbelow.
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proprietary function, so less caution is required. "It must
be remembered that when the State functions in its
propriety capacity, it will receive no better treatment than
any two private individuals who bring their dispute before
the courts for final resolution." Metropolitan Park Dist V,
Department of Natural Res., 85 Wash.2d 821, 539 P.2d
854, 859 (1975)." Id. at 676-677. (Emphasis supplied).
2.

URS9 Written Representations & Norm's Reasonable Reliance

Norm reasonably relied on the Annual Retirement Statements that he received
from the URS. The USRB's Conclusion number seven (7) notes that, "None of the
annual statements gave Petitioner [Norm] a total amount of service credit" is erroneous.
Norm's Exhibit 2 is an example of the Annual Retirement Statements that the URS sent
to Norm on an annual basis. (See, Exhibit J to the Addendum). On two (2) different
sections of the Annual Retirement Statement, the URS shows that Norm is accruing full
years of service credit for each of his employers.
First, on the third page of the 2004 Annual Statement (Norm's Exhibit 2 - R. 132 Exhibit J to the Addendum), on the right hand side, in the left column, it identifies that
Norm earned "total service" in 2004 under the "Noncontributory System Local
Government," of "1.000." The right column identifies that Norm earned "total service" in
2004 under the "Noncontributory System State and School," of "1.000." Simply
"adding" the total service in each of the systems, Norm accrued "2.000" years of total
service in 2004.
Second, the total service is further supported by the "service credit per system as
of December 31, 2004," included on the same page of the 2004 Annual Statement
(Norm's Exhibit 2 - R. 132) in the left had column which shows:
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"SERVICE CREDIT PER SYSTEM AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2004
CONTRIBUTORY LOCAL GOVERNMENT [1] 3.500 YEARS
NONCONTRIBUTORY LOCAL GOVERNMENT [2] 10.834 YEARS
NONCONTRIBUTORY STATE AND SCHOOL [2] 15.654 YEARS"
See, Norm's Exhibit 1 and Norm's Exhibit 2 at page 3, attached as
Exhibit I and J to the Addendum and which is incorporated
herein by this reference. R. 132, R 383 p. 141 - 143,
p. 149-151.
For the past five (5) years, Norm has received, retained, and relied on annual
statements from the URS wherein he was advised by the URS that he was earning years
of service credit for each of his qualifying full time positions and had received the
foregoing years of service credit incident to his employment. See, Norm's Exhibit 2 at
page 3 (R. 132); R. 383 p. 137 - 138, 141 - 143. Upon review of those Annual
Statements, Norm submits those Annual Statements demonstrate he was accruing years of
service credit with each of his employers.
The USRB's conclusion that Norm should have contacted the Retirement Office is
flawed for three (3) reasons. First, Norm testified that he contacted the URS in 2003 and
was told to simply "add up" all of the years of service. R. 383 p. 143 - 144. This is
consistent with the telephonic discussion between personnel of Norm's employers (Vee
Gooch, Tami Suzuki, and Rick Davis) as well as West Point City Attorney Felshaw King
when they contacted URS in 2005. Significantly, each independently testified he/she was
informed by the URS that Norm had "over thirty (30) years of service credit" and "had
plenty of years to retire."27 R. 383 p. 17 - 18, 99 - 100, 108 - 109, 119 - 120. Further,

27. Although the URS put on evidence by URS employees Ms. Stroud and Mr. Seeley
that they qualified their representations that Norm had thirty-one (31) years of
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Dustin Seeley and Marcia Stroud admitted that the questionnaire that URS Customer
Service personnel use when employees call in, does not include a question regarding
whether the employee has more than one (1) employer. R. 383 p. 44, 87; Respondent's
Exhibit 1 and 3 (R. 154, 155). Thus, even when an employee calls the URS pursuant to
the URS5 instruction on the Annual Statements, the employee is not provided with
accurate information because he (Norm in this case) is not informed about the purported
"minimizing" limitation contained in Utah Code Ann. 49-1 l-401(3)(c)(2005).
Second, the following language that the USRB relies on in the Annual Statements,
is inapplicable:
"To determine a monthly allowance estimate go to the Utah
Retirement System web site at www.urs.org and click on the
Retirement Benefit Estimate Calculator link. Follow the
guides and use information from this and previous statements
to determine an estimated allowance.
If you are a member in more than one Retirement System, if
you are a part-time elected or appointed official, or if you are
employed with two or more employers at the same time, you
will need to contact the Retirement Office." Norman's
Exhibit 2 at p. 3; Addendum Exhibit J (R. 132) (emphasis
supplied).
The USRB has taken this language out of context. The instruction to contact the
Retirement Office, "if you work with two or more employers at the same time," is in relation to

"unverified" service, the issue of whether the service was verified or was unverified is
irrelevant and a red herring for two (2) reasons. First, Ms. Stroud testified the she
ultimately verified Norm's years of service credit. R. 383 p. 51, 72 - 74, 79 - 80.
Second, the issue is not whether Norm actually performed the necessary work to accrue
the earned years of service credit at issue (which is undisputed), the issue is whether the
USRB is estopped from denying Norm his years of service credit based on its written and
oral misrepresentations.
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determining a member's estimated monthly allowance by using the URS website online
calculation, not whether the member's reported years of service credit are accurate or how to
calculate accrued years of service credit.
Third, the URS' Annual Statement instructs a member to contact the auditor only if the
information is inaccurate, and to do nothing if the information is accurate, to-wit:
"PLEASE EXAMINE THIS STATEMENT - If the
balances shown on the accompanying statement are not
correct, please write promptly giving details of any
differences to our auditors, Deloitte & Touche, Attention:
URS, 50 South Main Street, Suite 1800, Salt Lake City, UT
84144-0458, who are presently engaged in the regular
examination of our financial statements. Correspondence
should include your name, Social Security number, and a
copy of this statement. If this statement is correct, no reply
is necessary." (Bold in original) (Underlining emphasis
supplied) See, Norm's Exhibit 2 at page 2; Addendum
Exhibit J.
Moreover, the USRB's reliance on the 2003 Retirement Estimate does not vitiate
Norm's reasonable reliance on the URS Annual Statements mailed to him because the
2003 Retirement Estimate28 (showing only 3.5 years of service credit, which was crossed
out by Chris Blevins and 17.087 years was handwritten in) did not contain any statements

28. The USRB's reliance on the 2003 Retirement Estimate does not remedy the URS'
prior misrepresentations contained in the preceding Annual Statements because the URS
did not "correct" this alleged "error." First, Norm's 2004 Annual Statement should have
shown fewer years of service credit then are shown on Norm's 2003 Annual Statement.
Assuming arguendo, that the USRB's argument regarding the 2003 Retirement Estimate
would be persuasive to this Court, Norm submits that Estimate loses its persuasiveness in
light of the alleged "inaccurate" 2004 and 2005 Annual Statements the URS subsequently
mailed to Norm. Under Eldredge, the URS has a "strict duty of certitude... to abstain
from giving inaccurate or misleading advice." Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board
at 657. The transcript is clear that URS personnel did not comply with this duty under
Eldredge as applied to Norm's circumstances.
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regarding accuracy. See, R. 383 at p. 136- 137. Respondent's Exhibit 2 (R. 155 - 156)
and compare/contrast with Norm's Exhibit 2 (R. 130 — 131). Based on the prior Annual
Statements accurately showing Norm's years of service, Norm reasonably believed the
2003 Retirement Estimate must be a mistake, took no further action at the time, and
continued to rely on the subsequent Annual Statements that showed his full years of
service credit for all of his participating employers. R. 383 p. 135-137. Specifically,
when Norm's 2004 Annual Statement showed an accurate amount of total years of
service equaling 29.998 years that deviated from the 2003 Retirement Estimate, Norm
reasonably relied upon this 2004 Annual Statement and all of his prior Annual Statements
from the URS that he was receiving service credit towards retirement for each of his jobs.
See, Norm's Exhibit 2 (R. 131). Accordingly, and appropriately, Norm did not make any
further inquiries of the URS until he was ready to retire in the fall of 2005. R. 383 p. 135
-137,144.
URS personnel have actual knowledge that its Members, including Norm,
routinely rely on the Annual Statements. In fact, Marcia Stroud, Norm's Retirement
Advisor with the URS, testified that the information contained in the Annual Retirement
Statement (as identified in Norm's Exhibits 1 and 2 and as set forth in Exhibits I and J in
the Addendum) as accurate and that Members rely on the information contained in these
statements. R. 383 at p. 52 - 53. Ms. Vee Gooch also testified that she, in fact, relies on
the information contained in the URS Annual Statements she has received as being
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accurate in planning for her retirement years.
3,

R. 383 p. 25.

URS' Oral Representations & Norm's Reasonable Reliance

Ms. Gooch provided Norm's personnel file (submitted as Norm's Exhibit 3 R. 138
- 140), including a copy of Norm's first and last paychecks which show retirement
contributions were deductedfromhis paycheck. R. 383 p. 14-15. After speaking with a
URS employee who identified herself as Donna,30 Ms. Gooch testified that she informed
Norm "Donna" verified that: 1) Norm had earned years of service creditfromhis
employment with the Davis and Weber County Canal Company (the County); 2) all
required payments were paid into the retirement system for his 3.5 years of employment
with the County; and, 3) that Norm had a total of "thirty something" years of service
credit with the URS and was eligible to retire at anytime. R. 383 p. 17 -18. Ms. Gooch
testified that she was not told that this service was "unverified" by Donna. R. 383 p. 17 18.
Both Rick Davis, West Point City Manager, and Tami Suzuki, West Point City
Recorder and Human Resource Representative, spoke by telephone with URS employee
Marcia Stroud (in October of 2005) in which Ms. Stroud confirmed that Norm then had
thirty-one (31) years of service credit and was eligible to retire at any time. R. 383 at p.
99 - 100, 107 - 109. Although Ms. Stroud testified that she only spoke to Mr. Davis and

29. The URS did not challenge Ms. Gooch's reliance on her URS Annual Statements as
being reasonable nor did they present testimony that contradicted Ms. Gooch's testimony.
30. Although Donna Viganski, an account analyst with the URS, was identified as the
only Donna working at URS at this time, she testified that she did not recall speaking
with Ms. Gooch, or anyone else, regarding Norm. R. 383 at p. 11 - 13.
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not Ms. Suzuki and that a customer service technician can only give "unverified" years of
service credit over the phone (R. 383 p. 49 - 50, 73), she acknowledged that the URS had
subsequently "verified" Norm's thirty-one (31) years of service credit. R. 383 at p. 74.
Felshaw King, West Point City Attorney, and a practicing attorney for forty-four
(44) years, testified that he telephonically contacted the office of the URS on October 25,
2005, and spoke with two (2) of URS' employees - a Donna (Mr. King had received her
namefromMs. Gooch's conversation with Norm), who then transferred him to Mr.
Dustin Seeley. R. 383 at p. 118-119. Upon request, Mr. Seeley accessed Norm's
records on his URS computer and stated to Mr. King that "he (Norm) has plenty of years.
He has 31.495 years of service." R. 383 at p. 119 - 120. Because Mr. Seeley had
expressed to Mr. King that Norm had "plenty of years" to retire, Mr. King requested Mr.
Seeley to send him written confirmation of Norm's years of service credit. R. 383 at p.
119 - 120. Mr. Seeley indicated that he could not send him written verification to MR.
King but that Norm would instead have to request a Retirement Estimate. R. 383 at p.
120.
Mr. Seeley testified that he did not tell Mr. King that Norm had "plenty of years"
to retire but did admit that he informed Mr. ICin that Norm had "approximately thirty-one
(31) years of unverified service." R. 383 p. 38, 119 - 120. However, Mr. King testified
that Mr. Seeley never used the term "unverified" during their discussion. R. 383 p. 38,
119-120.
4.

Norm's Detrimental Reliance

In Finding of Fact number 13, The USRB determined that Norm relied on the
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Annual Retirement Statements issued to him showing he had plenty of years to retire with
over thirty (30) years of service. Finding number 13 supports Norm's testimony that he
was consistently led to believe by the URS that he was earning years of service credit for
both of his full time positions. Moreover, Norm testified that had he known in 1994 that
both of his positions would not count towards his years of service credit, then he would
have accepted the job with West Point City, but he would have resigned his job with the
State of Utah. Instead, he would have returned to work in the construction industry with
his brother as an appraiser and would have earned approximately $3,000 more per year.
Finding of fact no. 13; R. 372 - 373; R. 383 p. 150 - 152. Norm also testified that he had
earned seven hundred and seventy-seven (777) hours of sick leave that he would have
been able to cash out had he been allowed to retire as requested in October of 2005. R.
383 at p. 140-141.
5.

Unique Circumstances Involving Norm

The USRB held that Norm's circumstances are not unique as required to prove an
estoppel against a governmental agency:
Conclusion of Law No. 5.
"As a general rule, estoppel may not be invoked against a
governmental entity. In Utah, there is a limited exception to
this general principal for 'unusual circumstances' 'where it is
plain that the interests of justice so require.' This exception
applies, however, only if 'the facts may be found with such
certainty, and the injustice suffered is of sufficient gravity, to
invoke the exception.' Anderson v. Public Service Comm'n,
839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992)(citations omitted)." R. 374.
Norm's circumstance is unique because the Annual Retirement Estimates Norm
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received and relied on (showing that his thirty-two (32) years of service credit were not a
mere wish or belief) are no longer sent to employees by the URS. R. 383 p. 121. Second,
the USRB did not present evidence of any other specific individuals similarly situated to
Norm. Ms. Stroud testified that Norm's situation is an unusual case and that (in her seven
(7) years with the URS) she has not encountered another situation with more than one full
time employer either before or after Norm's case. R. 383 at p. 55. Mr. Seeley also
testified that he has not encountered a situation with more than one full time employer
prior to Norm. R. 383 p. 47. Ms. Lund testified that during her twenty-five (25) year
career, there have "not been a handful," "less than ten (10) employees," who had worked
two (2) full time jobs during the same time period. R. 383 p. (unavailable - transcript
incomplete). Significantly, Ms. Lund did not identify any specific employees who may
have been in similar situations to Norm. And, more importantly, the USRB presented no
actuarial basis that would overcome the Legislative intent that the USRIBA be interpreted
to provide Norm with the maximum benefits he is entitled to receive in this matter. In
sum, Norm's case is unique because it is the only case of its kind.
IV
NORM'S DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
BY THIS COURT HAS BEEN ABRIDGED BY THE
USRB'S FAILURE TO PRESERVE AN AUDIBLE AND
COMPLETE TRANCRIPT OF THE EVIDENTIARY
HEARING HELD BELOW
Our Utah Courts have previously held that the failure to keep an adequate record
of the proceedings constitutes a violation of due process. See, West Valley City v.
Roberts, 1999 UT App. 358, Tf 14, 993 P.2d 252. Further, USRB Rule 5(g) requires that
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an audio/digital record of the evidentiary hearing be made:
"The hearing shall be recorded at Board expense. The Board
will determine the method of recording and may specify
recording tape." USRB Rule 5(g)
Norm requested and paid for a transcript of the evidentiary hearing to be prepared
by a Certified Court Reporter. Although an audio/digital recording of the hearing was
made by the USRB, unfortunately, the original audio/digital record is incomplete and
terminates prior to Norm's counsel's cross-examination of Judy Lund, URS Retirement
Director. Despite Norm's counsel bringing this issue to the attention to the USRB in his
post hearing brief,31 and requesting the Hearing Officer to adopt proposed detailed
findings regarding the testimony of Ms. Lund to remedy this error, the USRB did not
ultimately address, adopt or explicitely explain its rejection of those proposed findings
nor did the USRB take any steps to remedy the omission of Ms. Lund's testimony from
the transcript. From Norm's perspective, and this Court can determine the critical
importance of Ms. Lund's testimony by casually perusing statement's of fact numbered
19, 38, and 42 hereinabove in which Ms. Lund acknowledges 1) Norm met all of the
statutory requirements to receive his thirty-two (32) years of service credit; 2) there were
no similarly situated employees; and 3) the URS did not have any documentation from
any URS actuary of any negative actuarial impact in the event that Norm were granted his
request to retire 32.795 years of service credit.
As evidenced by the additional evidence set forth in Statements of Fact numbered

31. See, footnote 1, supra.
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18 through 42, Norm submits the findings of fact in the USRB's Decision are insufficient
to allow for an adequate review on appeal. In Tolman v. Salt County Attorney, 818 P.2d
23, 32 (Utah Ct.App. 1991), this Court noted the necessary detail in findings that must be
made by an administrative law judge as follows:
"While it is true that the CSC stated its ultimate conclusions,
administrative bodies may not rely upon findings that contain
only ultimate conclusions. See Vali Convalescent & Care
Insts., 797 P.2d 438, 448 (Utah App.1990). Cf. Boston First
Nat 7 Bank v. County Bd. OfEqualization, 799 P.2d 1163,
1166 (Utah 1990) (agency expertise is not a substitute for
making adequate findings); Williams v. Mountain States Tel
& Tel Co., 763 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1988) ("commission
expertise is not an adequate basis upon which ultimate
findings ... may be based," quoting Mountain States Legal
Foundation v. Public Serv. Comm'n 636 P.2d 1047, 1051
(Utah 1981)). We cannot conclude from the mere statement
of the ultimate conclusions reached by the CSC that the CSC
ever actually considered and determined Tolman's legal
claims in accordance with established legal principles.™8
FN8. The Utah Supreme Court has clearly described the
detail required in administrative findings in order for a
reviewing court to protect the public from "arbitrary and
capricious administrative actions." Milne Truck Lines, 720
P.2datl378.
fAn administrative body] cannot discharge its statutory
responsibilities without making findings of fact on all
necessary ultimate issues under the governing statutory
standards. It is also essential that [an administrative body]
make subsidiary findings in sufficient detail that the
critical subordinate factual issues are highlighted and
resolved in such a fashion as to demonstrate that there is a
logical and legal basis or the ultimate conclusions. The
importance of complete, accurate, and consistent findings
of fact is essential to a proper determination by an
administrative agency. To that end, findings should be
sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact
and law, are reached. See generally, Rucker v. Dalton,
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598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). Without such findings,
this Court cannot perform its duty of reviewing [an
administrative body's] order in accordance with
established legal principals and of protecting the parties
and the public from arbitrary and capricious administrative
action.
Id. (emphasis added). Given the incomplete nature of the
record in this case, see note 5, the failure of the CSC to make
detailed findings was in itself an abuse of discretion. See
Nyrehn v. Industrial Comm % 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah
App.1990). Cf. Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d at
709-10 (district court permitted to accept additional evidence
in rule 65B proceedings when city council failed to enter
formal findings)." (Underlining emphasis supplied).
During the evidentiary hearing, the Hearing Officer noted that facts appeared to be
undisputed, but that there appeared to be a question of law. R. 383 p. 87. The parties
were, however, unable to reach a full stipulation as to the facts and proceeded to present
their witnesses and testimony. In his August 15, 2006 Ruling, the Hearing Officer again
noted that the testimony was undisputed as follows: "3. The undisputed facts in this case
do not rise to the level to work an estoppel against the Respondent..." R. 239 - 241;
Ruling at page 2. However, the USRB's Decision is bereft of the factual findings
regarding the "undisputed record testimony" of the Petitioner's witnesses regarding his
claim for estoppel (e.g. whether the Hearing Officer determined one witness was credible
over another, etc.). In addition to the transcript prematurely ending during Ms. Lund's
direct examination by Respondent's counsel, the quality of the transcript is such that the
certified court transcriber could not adequately hear the testimony of the witness, and
there are fifty-three (53) times in which the words "inaudible" appear in the transcript.
Although the USRB ruled that the undisputed facts do not rise to the level of
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estoppel, because the necessary factual findings supporting Norm's claims are not
included in the Findings and Order, as required under Tolman, the USRB's failure to
make such findings constitutes an abuse of discretion and constitutes reversible error on
appeal.

CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Norm respectfully requests that this Court reverse the USRB' s Decision in its
entirety and order the Respondents to permit Norm to retire with his full 32.795 years of
service credit as sought in his Request for Board Action dated January 18, 2006 (a copy is
attached as Exhibit E to the Addendum submitted concurrently herewith). Norm
respectfully requests that the Court schedule oral argument on this matter.
DATED this faft

dayof

fQcud)

,2007.
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